Ukraine
is still burning. Just as things had begun to go back to normal in the capital
Kiev, trouble brews on the southern Crimean peninsula. Russian militias have
taken over the airport and the parliament of Crimea. Are the militias egged on
by Russian President Vladimir Putin? It is too early to tell, but the militias
certainly have his tacit permission.
The crisis has provoked a plethora of analyses in international
media. There is talk of a dividing line between East and West - Russia versus Western Europe and the USA– with Ukraine
coveted by both sides. It is claimed that Western Ukraine wants to be part of the West, that Eastern Ukraine wants to be part of Russia and that we are dealing with nothing less than the future of
Ukraine; with a geopolitical tug-of-war. Should the country belong to Us or to Them? A popular question that,
unfortunately, is misguided. If we should try to explain current developments
in Ukraine – and the developments we may witness in the near future – we have
to be aware of four points:
1) Ukraine is not
divided between East and West
The notion that Ukraine is divided between East and West, that international allegiances change dramatically between Ukrainian regions, is
a myth that was developed jointly during the modern era by the Soviet Union and by Ukrainian
nationalists. Both parties had an interest in presenting Ukraine as a place to
defend against virulent nationalism or Soviet imperialism, depending on your
point of view. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union international media
then found this myth very helpful in trying to make sense of the new state,
particularly after Russia and the West again began to challenge each other.
Russia still wanted to be a great power and – as was often repeated in Moscow
and Washington alike – Russia cannot be a great power if it loses Ukraine. And
when Ukrainians and Russians at the same time happily yelled at each other – in
different languages, no less – well then Ukraine had to be split between the
West and Russia – right? International affairs in a reductio ad absurdum… But as so often happens, the rest of the
world paid attention to those who were shouting the loudest and forgot the
silent majority in Ukraine.
Ukraine is divided into at least four parts: Western Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, the Middle, and Crimea. What does this mean? It means that Western and Eastern Ukraine, as such, and their alleged geopolitical allegiances to the West and to the Russian East,
have little influence; that a Ukraine-centred Middle is increasing in importance;
and that Crimea is a completely different issue, not least due to the Tatars. I
will develop this point a bit later.
Western Ukraine, centred on L’viv and Galicia, was never particularly
prominent in Ukrainian politics. Well, you say, what about the heroes of the
Orange Revolution in 2004? What about Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko,
those vanguards of Ukrainian attempts to become part of the West? Tymoshenko,
as it so happens, is from Dnipropetrovs’k, one of the largest cities in eastern
Ukraine. And she was part of the business elites from eastern Ukraine, running
the country at the end of the 1990s. Certainly, she did then fall foul of the
authorities and, yes, she was prominent in the Orange Revolution and its
aftermath, but she was never a Ukrainian nationalist. On the contrary, she has
repeatedly shown herself very willing to cooperate with Russia. She does not
care for the now deposed President Viktor Yanukovych, but, then again, no one
does – not even in Russia. If Tymoshenko succeeds in regaining the power she
craves, cooperation with Russia will certainly be on the table. And as for poor
little Viktor Yushchenko, whose bid for a renewed presidential term was
democratically crushed in 2010… Well, Yushchenko – who talked so much about
Ukrainian entry in the European Union – was last seen accompanying Yanukovych in
Kiev at the international football game between Ukraine and England in the
autumn. It seems clear that neither Tymoshenko nor Yushchenko is prepared to do
battle for Western Ukraine, or for the West, against “wicked Russia.”
Well, in that case everything is run from Eastern Ukraine,
right? This is the homeland of Yanukovych, the bugbear of our tale, who has now
departed to Moscow. In eastern Ukraine people still long for Russia, Moscow and
the Soviet Union, right? Erm…no. When Yanukovych was elected Ukrainian
president in 2010 his campaign was supported by business elites, who, indeed,
mainly originate in the industrial heartland of eastern Ukraine. But these
people do not love Russia; and neither does Yanukovych. Yanukovych is in many
ways an incompetent politician, but since he had now succeeded in becoming
president he certainly had no intention of just following Putin’s lead. And his
wealthy supporters never had an interest in being swallowed by the big business
beasts in the Russian pond. During Yanukovych’s presidency Ukraine has
repeatedly sought further economic integration with the EU, which would benefit
the economy of Ukraine and its elites alike. As a consequence, Russia has
repeatedly attempted to force Yanukovych to split with the West – and this plan
succeeded a few months ago. Yet Yanukovych and his supporters only cooperated
with Russia for their own material benefit as rulers of Ukraine; not because
they are fond of Russia (that bumbling Yanukovych has now lost a lot of his Ukrainian
support through his tactical and strategic errors is a different matter).
This means that Ukrainian politics is neither Western nor
Russian. Where does that leave us? Well, it leaves us with the Middle, the
Ukrainian middle. And it leaves us with a situation where the vast majority of
people in Ukraine have family and friends in Russia. Yet they still understand
the economic advantages in cooperating with the EU as opposed to joining that
palace of illusions which is Eurasian cooperation centred on Moscow. In
November, when Yanukovych rejected cooperation with the EU and moved towards
Russia he had precious little support anywhere in Ukraine, including in the
east. Under pressure from Russia, perhaps looking to his personal interests and
with no political nous whatsoever, Yanukovych managed to become unpopular with
pretty much anybody in Ukraine. And, as indicated above, Putin never fancied
Yanukovych, who is viewed in Russia as a weakling.
2) Russia and Putin
have no strategic blueprint
During the last decade Western coverage of Russian foreign
policy has been dominated by a clear theme: Russia is controlled by Putin –
Putin is really clever and tough and ready to oppose the West and the USA –
Putin time and again outsmarts the West. That logic is clearly present in
coverage of the current Ukrainian conflict. Repeatedly, experts tell us that strategic-thinking
Russia is ahead of the West in its influence on Ukrainian events. This is an
understandable impression that unfortunately, is not supported by events.
Indeed, it never was.
If Putin and his Russian elites were masterminds, planning
everything in advance, why did the crisis escalate in Ukraine in the first
place? Putin definitely did not have an interest in toppling Yanukovych’s
regime. Just as Putin drew no benefits from the Orange Revolution. Or from the fact
that the Olympic Games in Sochi were overshadowed by the fight on Russian gay
rights in particular and human rights more generally. Since Putin came to power
in 2000 he has always been reacting to events, not acting in advance. That is now
again the case in Ukraine. Putin and his elites – remember that Putin is just
one of many people controlling Russia – realised far too late that Ukraine had
run away from Yanukovych. And this is just before and during Putin’s beloved
Olympics in Sochi. And, whoops, fights have now broken out in Kiev. And
Yanukovych has to run for it. And now there is a new government in Ukraine,
without being legitimated by elections and pulling Ukraine to the West – the horror!
We have to do something, Putin thinks – and all of a sudden militias in balaclavas
appear on Crimea. Home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. OK – let us assume for
the moment that Putin and Russia succeed in taking control over Crimea, in
taking the peninsula away from Ukraine. Then what? How can this benefit Russia?
Well it cannot – that is the point.
3) Crimean unrest is
bad for Russia
Can Russia take over Crimea? Certainly! Can Crimea declare
its independence under Russian protection, as happened in Georgia a few years
back? Absolutely! Will such a step in any way benefit Russia, Ukraine or
Crimea? Nope!
The peninsula of Crimea, reaching into the Black Sea from
southern Ukraine, was conquered by the Russian Empire through battle with the
local Muslim Tatars. Early in the twentieth century Crimea was then swiftly
incorporated in the Russian Soviet republic, as part of the Soviet Union.
Subsequently, Crimea was presented as a gift by Nikita Khrushchev to the
Ukrainian Soviet Republic, but that was hardly an issue as long as Crimea
remained part of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the fact that Stalin expelled the
Crimean Tatars to Central Asia did not really pose a problem, given the general
lack of interest the Soviet regime had in promoting public debate and human
rights. And then the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Crimea was still populated
mainly by Russians but now found itself in an independent Ukraine – and the
Tatars were coming back to reclaim the property and the land the Russians had
received from them under Stalin. Oh, and one of the largest Soviet naval bases,
home of the Black Sea Fleet, was still situated on Crimea. So trouble was
certainly brewing for the peninsula in independent Ukraine.
So far, things have gone better than might have been feared.
Partly because various Ukrainian administrations have sensibly allowed Crimea a
high degree of autonomy. Partly because the Russian Black Sea Fleet has, by and
large, been allowed to potter along in the vicinity of Sevastopol. Developments
have not been quite so good for the Tatars, who have not been able to
effectively press their claims without substantial Ukrainian or Russian
support. And now, masked militias – connected to (and partly supported by?)
Russia has taken over Crimea. And that is bad news for Russia.
Russia and many Russians often speak loudly about the Black
Sea Fleet – that symbol of Russian great power status. This is certainly right –
but why has the Fleet been allowed to decay? It hosts a large number of Russian
soldiers, who have reasonable conditions and pay, but the Fleet is not doing so
well. During the war with Georgia in 2008, the Fleet did not exactly shine; and
it is much smaller than the adjacent Turkish fleet – not to mention whatever
the Americans might introduce in the Black Sea region. Oh, and the Russian Black
Sea Fleet still contains a ship introduced by the emperor a century ago…
The point is that Russia needs the base, not the fleet. The
base at Sevastopol is a deep-water base, providing Russia with the option to
host and deploy large vessels to the Mediterranean, the Middle East and
elsewhere. The base offers plenty of work for soldiers and other Russian
personnel – and it thus does support Russian yearning to be a great power. But
all those advantages disappear if Crimea becomes the object of a Russo-Ukrainian
conflict. Unless Russia can take over Ukraine as a whole – and that is not a
possibility – Kiev will forcibly resist losing Crimea to Russia. This would
have been the case under Yanukovych, as well – no Ukrainian leader is prepared
to hand over parts of the country to Russia. Crimea could be the centre of
protracted strife, possibly armed strife, which would primarily harm those
Russian civilians and military personnel, who constitute the majority of
locals. That is not – and can never be – in the strategic interest of Russia or
Putin. Of course, the Crimean dispute can easily escalate, nonetheless, as long
as Russia, Ukraine and the West have no plan for solving the crisis. How might
such a plan look?
4) Ukraine is part of
Europe – and Russia is part of Europe
If the EU and the West is really going to help solving the
Ukrainian crisis we have to – once and for all – view Ukraine as well as Russia
as part of Europe. This does not mean that we should succumb to Putin’s great
power-Russia, dominating Europe and equalling the USA and China. Russia will
not be able to do that; and the sooner Putin gets that point, the better.
Russia has plenty of oil and gas, but in the long run oil and gas can only be
sold to customers, who trust in the reliability of Russian deliveries. Oil and
gas cannot be used strategically to ensure Russian influence.
At the same time, the fact that Russia and Ukraine are part
of Europe does not mean that we in the EU and the West should ignore the mainly
problems still facing Russia. Persecution of homosexuals in Russia is not OK.
Daily violence, bombings and general anarchy in the North Caucasus is not OK –
especially not when Putin and his elites are partly responsible. And when
elections are repeatedly falsified we cannot simply say: “Well, those Russians
don’t know better.” Yeah, they do – and we must make sure that they – and the
Ukrainians – remember it.
However, Russia and Ukraine have to be reminded of
democratic norms and rule-of-law within a European community. I do not believe
that Russia will ever join the EU or NATO (and Ukraine probably will not join
for decades). But the EU and NATO are not Europe. Europe is, and remains,
mutual frameworks of understanding, dialogue, and shared memory. Let us begin
to credit Russia and Ukraine for the amount of progress, which is taking place.
From both countries new generations have appeared who work very successfully in
Moscow, in Kiev – and in London, in Berlin and in Copenhagen. You do not hear
much about these people. The last decade, Russia in particular has enjoyed
significant amounts of successful cultural cooperation with the West – yet such
developments disappear under a deluge of bad news from Russia and Ukraine.
There is probably little hope for Putin and Yanukovych. The situation in Crimea
does currently look grim. But the crisis will eventually ease. And then we in
the EU, in the West, have to start including Russia and Ukraine in our
understanding of what it means to be part of our world – and not on the other
side of a fictitious dividing line.
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